This paper studies global social interactions in a stylized model of marriage and divorce with complementarities across agents. The key point of departure from traditional models of social interactions is that actions are interrelated and sequential. We establish existence and uniqueness results akin to those in traditional models. In contrast to these models, however, we show that the presence of strategic complementarities is no longer sufficient to generate a social multiplier that exceeds one in this environment. Self-fulfilling conformity, whereby a greater desire to conform at the individual level leads to greater homogeneity of choices in the aggregate, is not retained either. Some empirical implications are also discussed.
Introduction
Canonical models of social interactions examine agents who select an action from a unidimensional …n i t e choice set or an interval of the real line (e.g., Brock and Durlauf, 2001 or Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2003) . More recently, Horst and Scheinkman (2006) generalized the analysis by allowing for local and global social interactions in a model with multidimensional, continuous actions. In this paper we study global social interactions with interdependent and binary sequential actions in more than one dimension. As in previous papers, we prove the existence of an equilibrium under general conditions and uniqueness under tighter conditions that limit the in ‡uence of peer groups on individual preferences. However, this is the …r s t paper to show that strategic complementarities are not su¢ cient to generate a social multiplier greater than one in an environment where agents face a multidimensional choice set. We also identify and investigate the robustness of self-ful…lling conformity, a property which states that choices become more homogeneous when individuals' taste for conformity increases. Quite interestingly, while the wider literature on social interactions implicitly takes this property as given, we show that self-ful…lling conformity need not hold in our environment.
We develop these results in a concrete model of marriage and divorce to demonstrate their relevance and to clarify their intuition rather than to illuminate any facts about marriage and divorce per se, although the latter may be possible. Marriage and divorce decisions are clearly sequential and interdependent; the decision to marry or not depends on the likelihood of divorce, and a couple are less likely to divorce if they had been more selective about whom to marry.
Moreover, the actions of other agents can in ‡uence individual decisions through the search market, or by changing the social stigma (or reward) attached to any action. For example, the opportunity cost of marriage increases as the size of the single pool increases because one is more likely to meet attractive mates in a "thicker"market. Similarly, one is more inclined to divorce as the size of the divorcé market grows since the chance of successful remarriage increases. 1 Finally, for some people marriage and divorce decisions are a¤ected by prevailing norms. If most people marry relatively young, individuals may feel compelled to also marry young. If divorce is rare, a troubled couple may decide to stay together to avoid the stigma of divorce.
These mechanisms give rise to strategic complementarities on each dimension of decision making. That is, the incentive to marry young increases with the proportion of the population that marries young, and the incentive to divorce increases with the divorce rate. As such, we adopt a reduced form modeling approach where we directly assume strategic complementarities.
The Social Multiplier. Strategic complementarities arise when the marginal utility to one person of taking an action increases in the average level of the action taken by members of the agent's peer group. (An agent's peer group is the set of people whose actions in ‡uence the agent's preferences.) Thus, each agent's behavior is a¤ected by exogenously given fundamentals and by the endogenously determined behavior of his peers. 2 If equilibrium is unique or there is some selection device, in canonical models complementarities guarantee that a change in fundamentals has both a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect on behavior that work in the same direction. This results in a social multiplier, as in Becker and Murphy (2001) . "This social multiplier can also be thought of as a ratio P= I; where I is the average response of an individual action to an exogenous parameter (that a¤ects only that person) and P is the (per capita) response of the peer group to a change in the same parameter that a¤ects the entire peer group." (Scheinkman, 2008) Framed this way, strategic complementarities produce a social multiplier that exceeds one (e.g., Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2003) .
Surprisingly, strategic complementarities are not su¢ cient to generate a social multiplier larger than one when multiple decisions are interdependent. To see this, consider what happens to the long run likelihood of divorce when the private bene…t to marriage increases, say because of a tax break for married couples.
The typical social multiplier intuition would tell us that if the tax break applied to only one couple and that couple's probability of divorce decreases as a result of the tax break, then a tax break applied to everybody would further decrease the couple's probability of getting divorced as their peer group of divorced couples in the economy is now smaller. But this intuition ignores the fact that strategic complementarities are also acting on the decision to marry (i.e., the interdependent decision). As more people marry, the social incentive to marry is raised and thus selectivity into marriage is lowered. The tax break therefore increases the number of low quality marriages, which could actually increase the divorce rate. In this case the probability of divorce would decrease by less than if the tax break was only applied to one couple so that the social multiplier on the probability of divorce is less than one.
Similarly, the social multiplier on the probability of remaining single can be less than one when individuals are forward-looking. If the probability of divorce falls with a marriage tax break after accounting for all the direct and indirect e¤ects, this will increase the social cost of divorce and force unhappy couples to stay together. The net e¤ect may be that the expected social value of marriage in the future life periods actually falls. Anticipating this unpleasant outcome, singles may lower their selectivity into marriage by less than they would when the tax break applies to only them. We illustrate this possibility with a numerical example in Section 5.
Self-ful…lling
In many models of social interactions with strategic complementarities, the degree of homogeneity increases with the individual desire to conform. As a useful expedient, let us call this seemingly tautological relationship self-ful…lling conformity. 3 To date the literature has focused on how even a small desire to conform can lead to a relatively large degree of homogeneity (e.g., Bernheim, 1994; Schelling, 1971) . As Bernheim (1994: 844) puts it: "When status is su¢ ciently important relative to intrinsic utility..., many individuals conform to a single, homogeneous standard of behavior, despite heterogeneous underlying preferences." We take the analysis in a different direction and show that self-ful…lling conformity is not a tautology as it can easily break down in a multi dimensional choice setting.
If young marriage is common and divorce is rare, the self-ful…lling conformity intuition indicates that an increase in the desire to conform would result in more young marriages and a lower divorce rate. However, we can show that self-ful…lling conformity can break down because of the interdependence between marriage and divorce decisions. More young marriages occur only when couples become less selective in their partner choice. If this drop in selectivity is signi…cant, the divorce rate may actually increase because of the larger share of low quality marriages. In other words, an increase in the taste for conformity may increase heterogeneity in divorce decisions. A numerical example in Section 5 illustrates that a greater taste for conformity can increase heterogeneity in marriage decisions when agents are forward looking as well.
Uniqueness under Moderate Social In ‡uence. The social multiplier and self-ful…lling conformity are well-de…ned only if equilibrium is unique or an appropriate selection device is used. This is an important quali…cation 3 A precise de…nition is given in Section 4.3 in the context of the model.
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in models with strategic complementarities as they tend to generate multiple equilibria. A general …n d i n g in the literature is that equilibrium is unique under conditions that limit the in ‡uence of peers on individual preferences (Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2003; Horst and Scheinkman, 2006) 4 , a property Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003) call uniqueness under moderate social in ‡uence (MSI). Horst and Scheinkman (2006) show that uniqueness under MSI obtains in a model where actions are continuous and the choice set is multidimensional. 5 This paper proves this result for discrete and sequential actions in more than one dimension.
Equilibrium is characterized by a pair of equations which implicitly de…ne the selectivity into marriage and the divorce threshold. To prove uniqueness, we …r s t recast this pair of equations as an implicitly de…ned discrete-time dynamic system. Then we …n d a su¢ cient condition under which a …x e d point of such a system is globally asymptotically stable (and hence unique). This result, Lemma 2, may be of independent interest and generalizes Proposition 2 in Fujimoto (1986) to the case of implicitly de…ned systems. When applied to the model, this su¢ ciency condition limits the in ‡uence of peer groups on individual preferences, that is, uniqueness under MSI obtains. A bene…t of this approach is that if the condition is met in equilibrium then the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable. Like Brock and Durlauf (2001), we use local (asymptotic) stability as a selection device. This ensures that the social multiplier and self-ful…lling conformity are well-de…ned.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the model and de…nes the peer groups. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium and proves existence. Section 4 is the main section of the paper. It contains the proof of uniqueness under MSI and the conditions for local asymptotic stability. The section continues by formally showing that when agents are myopic, the social multiplier on the probability of divorce may be less than one and that self-ful…lling conformity may not hold among the old and married. Section 5 presents numerical examples with forward-looking agents where the social multiplier on the probability of marriage is less than one and where self-ful…lling conformity fails to obtain among the young. Section 6 discusses some empirical implications of the analysis and Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs which do not appear in the text and all …g u r e s of the numerical comparative statics analysis.
The Model

Meetings, Choices, and Match Quality
A countably in…nite number of identical agents indexed by i 2 f1; :::; 1g begin life single and advance through two stages of life, young (y) and old (o).
When young, agent i is paired with agent i + 1 for i odd. A pair of matched singles is called couple i for brevity even though i refers to just one person. A couple decides to remain single or marry based on their match quality, which is an observable random variable y assigned by nature and common to both agents. Let i y be couple i 0 s realization of y : Assume y is identically and independently distributed across couples according to the distribution F y . Assume F y is continuously di¤erentiable, has …n i t e mean, and has a support large enough so that a positive measure of singles chooses to marry and a positive measure chooses to remain single.
When agents are old, those who did not marry while young must remain single when old. Those who married when young must decide to remain married or divorce based on a new match quality o assigned by nature. Couple i 0 s realization of o ; denoted i o ; is observed by and common to both agents. The distribution of o given y = y is F o (:j y ) and is i.i.d. across couples. Assume F o is continuously di¤erentiable in both arguments; has …n i t e mean, and is increasing in y in the sense of …r s t order stochastic dominance: for any z; @Fo(zj y) @ y < 0: This assumption captures the intuition that expected match quality when old should be increasing in match quality when young. The support of F o (:j y ) is assumed large enough so that a positive measure of married couples divorces and a positive measure remains married. An individual's marital status is denoted s; m; and d for single (never married), married, and divorced, respectively. The possible life paths are illustrated in Figure 1 . The assumptions that singles may marry only when young and that remarriage is impossible are made for the sake of parsimony. A richer model would not change the qualitative nature of the results because the number of decision nodes equals the number of equations in the system that describes the equilibrium and the results are independent of the system's dimensionality, so long as it is at least two and …n i t e .
Payo¤s
Let l index the life stage, l 2 fy; og : Payo¤s depend on marital status , realized match quality 
Payo¤s are received at the end of a life stage and are a weighted sum of the private payo¤ u (determined exogenously) and the social payo¤ v (determined endogenously). The parameter 0 can be interpreted as the taste for conformity ; social payo¤s a¤ect preferences more as the taste for conformity increases. The additive separation between private and social payo¤s, and the quasi-linearity imposed below, are assumptions designed to increase the transparency of the results. The results hold for the more general payo¤ function U( ; l; 
Private Payo¤s (u)
The private payo¤ to singlehood is normalized to zero: u(s; :) = 0: The private payo¤ to marriage is u(m;
6 The constant 2 R represents the gains or losses for the typical couple from marriage versus singlehood, which may arise from things like economies of scale in household production, the tax treatment of married people versus singles, etc. Match quality represents the idiosyncratic payo¤s to marriage, including love. A divorcé receives the payo¤ to singlehood but must also incur the cost of divorce, c 2 R + : Thus, u(d; :) = c: 
Social Payo¤s (v)
Social payo¤ s capture the impact that peer groups have on preferences. Since p = p( ; l) is the proportion of an agent's peer group that shares his marital status, assume v(p) is strictly increasing in p to get strategic complementarities. 7 We also make the technical assumption that v is smooth on its compact domain [0; 1]: This guarantees that v and its derivatives are bounded. Let v v(1) denote the maximum value of the function v.
An agent's peer group depends on his marital status and life stage. Peer groups are speci…c to the life stage; social payo¤s when young are based only on what other young people are doing whereas social payo¤s when old are de…ned relative to the behavior of other old people. Since everyone starts out single and must choose to remain single or marry when young, the peer group when young is simply the entire population. Letting be the proportion of young people who remain single and 1 be the proportion who marry young (the marriage rate), we have p(s; y) = and p(m; y) = 1 : We will sometimes refer to as the size of the single pool.
While the whole population is the natural peer group for young people, there is not a clear choice for the old because individuals can begin this life stage either single or married. At least two reasonable peer groups may be speci…ed. One option is to de…ne it as the subpopulation of individuals who share the same marital status at the beginning of the second stage of life. As justi…cation, one might argue that the stigma of divorce should depend only on the divorce rate (i.e., the proportion of marriages that end in divorce) and not on the proportion of the population that is divorced, (1 ) . Alternatively, the entire population might be chosen as a peer group so that what matters is only the partition of the population at the end of the period. In the absence of any theory or evidence that supports one approach over the other, we assume the former primarily because it facilitates the analysis. This gives p(d; o) = and p(m; o) = 1 : Also, p(s; o) = 1 since individuals who chose to remain single when young must remain single when old. The total payo¤ function is summarized in Table 1 .
The key results in the paper are driven by the fact that marriage and divorce decisions are interdependent. This interdependence arises regardless of the peer group speci…ed, so the qualitative nature of the results is not sensitive to the choice of peer group. 8 
Expectations and Timing
To complete the model, assume that individuals are expected payo¤ maximizers. Expectations about match quality are calculated from the distributions F y and F o ( j y ). Expectations about peer group behavior are rational and determined in equilibrium. Figure 2 summarizes the within period timing. It should be emphasized that, within life stages, agents make decisions simultaneously. 
Equilibrium
A strategy for an agent maps the set of possible realized match qualities into a feasible action at each of the two decision nodes. A strategy pro…le constitutes an equilibrium if, for every agent and at every decision node, the expected payo¤ of an agent's strategy is at least as good as any alternative strategy, holding the strategies of all other agents …x e d .
The behavior of any single agent (or pair of agents) has no impact on the state variables and since the population is in…nitely large. Consequently, one can derive a particular agent's optimal strategy taking the state variables 8 In fact, we have explicitly solved the model under the alternative peer group for old individuals. The analysis was more complex yet we found no important di¤erences. These results are available upon request.
as given. Recall also that agents are identical and two agents in a couple receive the same payo¤s to marital status choices. Thus there will never be disagreement about which action to take and we may analyze the couple's choice as an individual decision problem. We use backward induction to show that the unique optimal strategy is a cuto¤ strategy at each decision node.
If an individual begins the second life stage married, he may either remain married or get divorced. The agent, taking the strategies of other agents as given (and hence the values of and ), chooses to remain married if and only if
where we have suppressed the i superscript on o . The left hand side of the inequality is the payo¤ to remaining married while the right hand side is the payo¤ to getting a divorce. Thus, the optimal strategy is a cuto¤ strategy such that an individual remains married if and only if the realized match quality, o ; exceeds some divorce threshold, z, where z solves
A young individual must decide to remain single or marry. Letting 0 <1 be the time preference factor, a young agent marries her match i¤
where
The left hand side of this inequality is the expected value of marriage while the right hand side is the value of singlehood. The term E[V (m)j y ] is the expected present value of being married in the second period given y = y . Since this term is increasing in y by …r s t order stochastic dominance, y + E[V (m)j y ] traverses the real line as y traverses the real line. The unique optimal strategy is therefore a cuto¤ strategy such that an individual marries i¤ y x; where x is de…ned implicitly by
Call x the selectivity when young.
Since all agents are optimally using the same cuto¤ strategy in any equilibrium, and can be straightforwardly calculated for any set fx; zg of cuto¤ values.
Lemma 1 For any set of cuto¤ values fx; yg ;
= (x) = Pr( y < x) almost surely and = (x; z) = Pr( o < zj y x) almost surely.
Proof. See Appendix.
On a technical note, this is the key observation that allows the population equilibrium to be characterized (a:s:) by a system of deterministic equations. In particular, Lemma 1 allows equations (2) and (3) to be rewritten as follows:
It follows that the equilibrium cuto¤ strategies are a …x e d point of system (4). We prove in the Appendix that an equilibrium always exists. The proof …r s t shows that we can restrict our search for an equilibrium to a compact and convex set, and then applies Brouwer's …x e d point theorem.
Theorem 1 An equilibrium exists.
Analysis
From the discussion in the introduction, three questions will guide the analysis: (i) Under what conditions is there a unique equilibrium? (ii) How does the population react to a change in the fundamentals (e.g., a change in )? (iii) How does an increase in the taste for conformity, ; a¤ect homogeneity? These questions relate to uniqueness under MSI, the social multiplier, and self-ful…lling conformity, respectively.
Uniqueness under MSI
Recall that uniqueness under moderate social in ‡uences (MSI) says that the population will arrive at a unique equilibrium if individual preferences are not too sensitive to changes in the social environment. To show that this property holds in the present model, we follow Brock and Durlauf (2001) by …r s t recasting the equilibrium system (4) as a dynamic one. Then we look for conditions that guarantee asymptotic stability. This is a fruitful approach because when the condition is applied globally we guarantee uniqueness; applied locally, we ensure the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable. The comparative statics exercises that follow are meaningful at a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium even if there are multiple equilibria.
The cuto¤ values that determine the state variables are lagged in the dynamic analogue to system (4):
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A crucial observation is that system (5) has the same set of …x e d points as system (4). Thus, equilibrium is unique in the dynamic version i¤ it is unique in the static version.
One di¢ culty with this approach is that the dynamic system (5) is implicitly de…ned, so standard stability results for dynamic systems of the form a t+1 = H (a t ) do not directly apply. We resolve this issue in the next lemma by extending a standard global asymptotic stability result (e.g., Proposition 2 in Fujimoto, 1986) to implicitly de…ned discrete dynamic systems.
For convenience, we …r s t review some concepts from stability theory. Given an initial condition a 0 and letting H : R n ! R n ; the dynamic system a t+1 = H (a t ) generates a sequence of points fa 0 ; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::g called the forward orbit. A point a 2 R n is an equilibrium or …x e d point of this system if a = H ( a) : A …x e d point a is said to be stable if for any " > 0 there exists > 0 such that whenever ka 0 ak < ; the points a t in the forward orbit satisfy ka t ak < " for t > 0: A …x e d point a is (locally) asymptotically stable if it is stable and, in addition, there exists r > 0 such that for all a 0 satisfying ka 0 ak < r; the iterates a t satisfy lim t!1 a t = a: A …x e d point a is a global attractor on an interval I if a 0 2 I implies lim t!1 a t = a: A …x e d point a is globally asymptotically stable if it is stable and is a global attractor.
Lemma 2 Let
with component functions H i (a i;t+1 ; a t ); where a i;t+1 2 A i R; i = 1; :::; n; and
Assume for all i a) H i is strictly monotone in a i;t+1 and continuously di¤erentiable, b) 8 a t 2 A; 9 a t+1 2 A such that H(a t+1 ; a t ) = 0; and c) A is non-empty and convex.
If H has a …x ed point, it is globally asymptotically stable (on A) so long as, for any (a t+1 ; a t ) in A A and some matrix p-norm k:
Proof. See Appendix. D y H is the matrix of partial derivatives induced by di¤erentiating H with respect to vector y: A matrix p-norm k:k p is a matrix norm induced from à p vector norm. 11 If condition (M) holds, we can …n d a Liapunov function which then implies that a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium exists.
A little more notation is needed to apply the result. Let v 0 be the maximum value that the derivative of the social payo¤ function v can take. (Recall that v 0 0 by assumption). Similarly, let s be the supremum of the set of absolute values that the derivatives of (x) and (z; x) can take with respect to any variable. Since x ; z 0 and x 0; this means x ; z ; j x j s: 12 Finally, let :
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness under MSI) Some combination of the bounds v 0 , s and can be tightened to ensure that condition (M) is satis…ed in system (5). In this case equilibrium is unique. 11 Recall that for each`p vector norm kk p on R k one may de…ne an associated matrix norm of a k k matrix A by kAk p = max
12 Here and throughout the rest of the paper, y x is de…ned as the partial derivative of y with respect to x; y x @y @x :
It is important to note that the bounds restrict the magnitude of the changes in the social payo¤ function and not necessarily the size of the social payo¤s. It is possible to have a unique equilibrium if social payo¤s strongly a¤ect preferences (i.e., is large) if the bounds v 0 or s are small. However, a small taste for conformity ( small) is also su¢ cient to guarantee uniqueness.
Qualitatively, this is exactly what drives uniqueness under (average) moderate social in ‡uence in Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002) and Horst and Scheinkman (2006) . The …r s t of these papers derives this result when the choice set is unidimensional while the second accommodates an n-dimensional choice set. However, both papers focus on continuous actions whereas actions are discrete in this paper. Consequently, the uniqueness result in Horst and Scheinkman (2006) does not directly apply here. The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in the Appendix.
Later in the paper we will apply Theorem 2 locally around an equilibrium so we write out condition (M) below for this case. We also introduce some shorthand notation. For the matrix 1 norm; which for a k k matrix A is max
The Social Multiplier
This subsection investigates the direct and indirect e¤ects on behavior of a marginal increase in the private bene…t to marriage : The goal is to show 13 See the Appendix for the details on how to derive these conditions. that the social multiplier can be less than one despite the presence of strategic complementarities. It is understood that the analysis takes place at an equilibrium where condition (M) is satis…ed. The two choice sets agents potentially face in life are {remain single, marry} when young and {divorce, remain married} when old and married. Since choice sets are discrete, a "behavior" is interpreted as the probability of taking an action. As there are two choice sets, we are interested in the reaction of two behaviors to an increase in : the probability of remaining single, Pr( y < x); and the expected probability of divorce given marriage, Pr( o < zj y x):
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The social multiplier on any given behavior is the equilibrium response to a change in divided by the individual response that would occur if the change in applied to only one couple. For example, the equilibrium change in the probability of remaining single is
: If increases for just one pair of matched singles, the resulting change in their behavior has no e¤ect on or (the size of the single pool and the divorce rate, respectively) since the couple has measure zero. Consequently the pair of matched singles for whom increases lowers their selectivity into marriage by
; where
when x ; x ; and z are set equal to zero. Thus, the social multiplier on the probability of remaining single is
: Call this the singlehood multiplier.
Similarly, the equilibrium response to an increase in on the probability of divorce if married is : The social multiplier on the probability of divorce given marriage, or the divorce multiplier, is then
The full expressions for the singlehood multiplier and the divorce multiplier are derived in the Appendix. These expressions are complicated and not very illuminating. Nevertheless, the only restrictions on the values of these multipliers are imposed by condition (M). In general, these restrictions are not enough to guarantee that each of these multipliers is greater than one. In fact, we may conclude that the presence of strategic complementarities is not su¢ cient to generate a social multiplier that is greater than one if there exists a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium in which either of the multipliers is less than one. This possibility is most easily illustrated with myopic agents, = 0; in which case the divorce multiplier may be less than one. Later we show with a numerical example in Section 5 that the singlehood multiplier may be less than one when >0: When = 0 condition (M) is satis…ed at equilibrium using the matrix 1 norm if z T < 1 and j x j T + x S < 1: In this case z T; j x j T; and x S are each guaranteed to be between zero and one. Therefore the social multipliers are
; and (9)
Proposition 1 Suppose = 0; >0; and that condition (M) is satis…ed at equilibrium using the matrix 1 norm. a) The singlehood multiplier,
; always exceeds one.
b) The divorce multiplier,
; is less than one if z > j x j and
(1 zT ) xS < ; where 2 (0; 1) is de…ned such that z = j x j : The divorce multiplier is unde…ned if j x j = z and is otherwise greater than or equal to one. (1 zT ) xS ; but this is always true since < 1 when j x j > z : When
z < 0 it is easy to see that the divorce multiplier is less than one if and only if < .
First concentrate on the e¤ect of an increase in on the decision to remain single. An increase in directly lowers the probability of remaining single since agents are myopic and ignore outcomes when old. But there is also an indirect e¤ect because the single pool shrinks, and this further decreases the incentive to remain single. Since the direct and indirect e¤ects of an increase in move in the same direction, the singlehood multiplier exceeds one.
Turning to the divorce multiplier, …r s t consider the case where the individual response to an increase in is an increase in the probability of divorce,
The equilibrium response takes into account both the indirect e¤ect on marriage selectivity discussed in the previous paragraph and the indirect e¤ect on the divorce decision. These indirect e¤ects make divorce more likely since selectivity into marriage falls even further and, respectively, the divorce threshold increases since the divorce rate is higher. The divorce multiplier exceeds one since these indirect e¤ects reinforce the direct e¤ect.
The divorce multiplier is less than one if
The …r s t condition says, for example, that a marriage tax break applied to one, and only one, "special" couple will lower the probability that the couple divorces. That is, the a priori divorce probability is more sensitive to a unit decrease in the divorce threshold than to a unit decrease in marriage selectivity. This allows for the possibility that once the tax break is applied to everyone, the additional decrease in marriage selectivity due to complementarities among the young is enough to raise the probability of divorce relative to the situation in which only the special couple receives the tax break. Condition (12) quanti…es when this possibility arises. When it does, the divorce multiplier is less than one. To make this intuition more precise, suppose that before any changes to the tax laws, there is a divorce stigma and an "old maid" stigma. The fact that < 1 implies that in order for condition (12) to hold, we must have
If a tax break is introduced for married couples, the left hand side may be thought of as the increase in the divorce stigma due to a lower divorce threshold. The term j x j T is the decrease in the divorce stigma due to a lower marriage selectivity. Note that condition (11) implies z T > j x j T: The term x S may be thought of as the increase in the old maid stigma due to the fact that lower marriage selectivity implies that fewer young people remain single. Thus, if the increase in the old maid stigma is large enough, the divorce multiplier will be less than one. (Note that condition (12) is more likely to hold the larger are x S and x T; but less likely to hold the larger is z T:) The reason for this is that the increased old maid stigma puts additional downward pressure on marriage selectivity, and this in turn puts upward pressure on the divorce rate.
The general idea is that while there are complementarities within each individual decision, there are "anti-complementarities" between decisions. When fewer people divorce, the social incentive to divorce is lowered due to complementarities in the divorce decision. When more young people marry the social incentive to marry increases due to complementarities in the marriage decision. However, more young people marry only when their marriage selectivity decreases, thus increasing the chances of divorce later in life due to bad match quality. This gives rise to "anti-complementarities" between marriage and divorce decisions when, absent complementarities in the marriage decision, an increase in the private bene…t to marriage reduces the likelihood of divorce.
This intuition is generalizable to other contexts. The most straightforward extensions involve other "marriage-like" decisions where social interactions might in ‡uence start/quit decisions. Examples include the prices at which to buy/sell …n a n c i a l assets, when to accept/quit a job, and when to start/quit smoking. Neither the sequentiality nor the binary nature of the decisions is important, however; what matters is the interdependence of decisions.
As an example, consider a student who must allocate a …x e d amount of time between studying and spending time on a social networking website like Facebook. This is a static decision problem with continuous choices. Moreover, these decisions are interdependent since devoting an extra hour to Faceb o ok requires one hour less of studying. If we assume there are complementarities in each decision, then "anti-complementarities" arise if the two goods are complements. 15 To see this, suppose the administrators of Faceb o ok make the site more user friendly, thereby reducing the price of use. Imagine …r s t that only one person has access to the more user-friendly site as a beta-tester. 16 The betatester will increase her time on Faceb o ok and on studying since the goods are complements. Once the user-friendly version of the site is released to the general public, her peers will also spend more time on Faceb o ok and more time studying. This increases the social incentive to undertake each activity due to complementarities. However, "anti-complementarities" arise due to 15 One should be careful not to confuse the term complements with complementarities. In this context, complementarities arise when the incentive to take an action increases in the average level of the action taken by members of the agent's peer group. Using the standard economic de…nition, two goods are complements if an increase in the price of one good reduces the quantity demanded of the other. 16 A beta-tester is a person who uses software before it is released to the general public in order to identify bugs or other issues with the software. the scarcity of time. If the increased social incentive to study is stronger than the increased social incentive to spend time on Faceb o ok, she may end up spending less time on Faceb o ok compared to the previous situation in which she was a beta-tester. 17 If so, the social multiplier on Faceb o ok time is less than one. Clearly, this example generalizes to any situation where agents allocate a scarce resource across two or more network goods.
Self-Ful…lling Conformity
Recall that self-ful…lling conformity refers to the monotonic relationship between individual taste for conformity and homogeneity of behavior. Typically this means that if in equilibrium the marginal social utility of taking an action is positive, an increase in the taste for conformity increases the average level of an action taken within a reference group. When the choice set contains two actions, as is the case in this application, the marginal social utility to action 1 is positive if the di¤erence in social payo¤s between actions 1 and 2 is positive. The average level of the action refers to the proportion of the reference group that takes the action.
Let MSU d be the marginal social utility of divorce (i.e., the social payo¤ di¤erence between divorcing and remaining married) and let MSU s be the marginal social utility of remaining single (i.e., the social payo¤ di¤erence between remaining single and marrying). The proportion of the old and married that divorces is and the proportion of the young that remains single is : The taste for conformity is parameterized by : Self-ful…lling conformity thus obtains among the young if and only if sign (MSU s ) = sign at any equilibrium. 17 To be clear, we are not arguing for a violation of the Law of Demand by claiming that she will reduce her time on Faceb o ok compared to the situation before she became a betatester. Rather, once the software is released to the general public, the time she spends on Faceb o ok may be somewhere in between the time she spent before she became a beta-tester and the time she spent while she was a beta-tester.
As with the social multipliers, the full expressions for
are not very illuminating so they are relegated to the Appendix. Also, the only restrictions on these expressions come from condition (M). In general, these restrictions are not enough to guarantee that self-ful…lling conformity obtains. When >0 a numerical example in Section 5 illustrates that self-ful…lling conformity may fail among the young. The analysis and intuition are simpler when agents are myopic, or = 0. We make this assumption for the remainder of this section. In this case, self-ful…lling conformity may fail to obtain among the old and married.
The analysis is restricted to equilibria where condition (M) is satis…ed locally using the matrix 1-norm. As before, this ensures that x S; j x j T; and z S are each between zero and one. We have
The e¤ect on and of an increase in the desire to conform is ; respectively. When = 0 these expressions equal
Proposition 2 Suppose = 0; >0; and that condition (M) is satis…ed at equilibrium using the matrix-1 norm.
(a) Self-ful…lling conformity obtains among the young. But now suppose MSU s < 0 and MSU d < 0: Self-ful…lling conformity obtains i¤
It is easy to see that self-ful…lling conformity fails under the same condition when MSU s > 0 and MSU d > 0: Self-ful…lling conformity may fail to obtain among the old and married when sign(MSU
The …r s t condition ensures that an increase in the taste for conformity has an impact on marriage selectivity that pushes the divorce rate in the socially penalized direction. The second condition ensures that this e¤ect is strong enough to overtake the e¤ect of an increase in the taste for conformity on the divorce threshold.
To be precise, suppose MSU s ; MSU d < 0: In this case an increase in the taste for conformity lowers marriage selectivity (perhaps because of an "old maid" stigma) and lowers the divorce threshold (perhaps because of the divorce stigma). The term z M SU d is the downward pressure on the divorce rate when fully accounting for the strength of the divorce stigma. Similarly, j x j jMSU s j 1 xS is the upward pressure on the divorce rate when fully accounting for the strength of the old maid stigma where the term 1 1 xS accounts for how self-ful…lling conformity among the young has strengthened the old maid stigma. Thus, self-ful…lling conformity fails to obtain among the old if the weighted e¤ect of lower selectivity on the divorce rate exceeds the weighted e¤ect of a lower divorce threshold.
In contrast, if sign(MSU s ) 6 =sign MSU d self ful…lling conformity obtains because an increase in the taste for conformity pushes the divorce rate in the socially rewarded direction. For example, MSU s > 0 and MSU d < 0 means that young marriage and divorce are socially penalized in equilibrium. An increase in the taste for conformity increases marriage selectivity and lowers the divorce threshold. 18 Both e¤ects make divorce less likely. More generally self-ful…lling conformity can fail in contexts where multiple decisions are in ‡uenced by peer groups and, crucially, at least one decision a¤ects the incentives surrounding some other decision. In this context an increase in the taste for conformity can lead to less homogeneity of choices in at least one of the peer groups. In the marriage model, the two decisions are whether to marry and, once married, whether to divorce. All else equal, one's marriage selectivity in ‡uences the likelihood of divorce. As just shown, this can lead to a breakdown of self-ful…lling conformity among the old.
The same intuition applies in other contexts. One straightforward example is in labor markets where a worker's decision to accept or quit a job is in ‡uenced by the perceived match quality between the employee and the …r m . The time allocation problem from the previous subsection also applies. An increase in the taste for conformity can increase the time spent on either Facebook or studying, but not both since time is scarce. If the social marginal utility of each activity is positive, then self-ful…lling conformity fails in the peer group surrounding one of the two decisions.
Numerical Examples with Forward-Lo oki ng Agents
The preceding section has already accomplished the goals of this paper: to prove uniqueness under MSI, and to show that when agents take interrelated and sequential actions in more than one dimension, the presence of strategic complementarities is not su¢ cient to generate a social multiplier greater than one nor to ensure that self-ful…lling conformity obtains. We demonstrated the last two points with the divorce multiplier and self-ful…lling conformity among the old and married when = 0. This section strengthens the argument by showing that with forward-looking agents the singlehood multiplier can be less than one and self-ful…lling conformity can fail among the young. We parameterize the model in the following way. Let match quality when young y be distributed uniformly on [0; 1] and match quality when old o j y be distributed uniformly on [ 1; 1 + y ]: The distribution of o j y is clearly increasing in y in the sense of …r s t -o r d e r stochastic dominance. Moreover, each distribution is continuously di¤erentiable on the interior of its support and has …n i t e mean. Letting v(p) = p 4 ; a detailed derivation in the Appendix shows that equilibrium is given by 
Parameters Va l ue
Since = Pr ( y < x) and = Pr( o < zj y x) a:s:; we have (a:s:)
and
The expression for is straightforward; the calculation for is in the Appendix.
We are searching for a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium in which the singlehood multiplier is less than one, and a second stable equilibrium where self-ful…lling conformity fails to obtain among the young. Since we assume >0; the equations we use are found in the Appendix. Speci…cally, the equilibrium is stable if condition (M) is satis…ed locally using matrix (18) . The singlehood multiplier is equation (19) . For self-ful…lling conformity, MSU are expressed in equations (22) and (24) . 20 The parameters for the examples are shown in Table 2 , and the outcomes are displayed in Table 3 . We emphasize that the parameter values re ‡ect preferences and are chosen for illustrative purposes only. We compute the matrix 1-norm to verify an asymptotically stable equilibrium. Figure 3 helps to explain the intuition for why the singlehood multiplier is less than one in Example 1. While panel A shows that an increase in the private bene…t to marriage shrinks the single pool ( ), in panel B we see that the marginal social utility of remaining single (MSU s ) increases for the marginal pair of young matched singles (the pair for whom y = x): This counterintuitive result occurs because the expected social value of marriage (ESV M) in the second period falls (panel B). 21 As a result, forward-looking singles lower their selectivity into marriage by less than they would if the increase in applied to only them. 
is strong, so linear tests may fail to detect the presence of social interactions when in fact they exist. That is, peer groups may have a strong in ‡uence on preferences even if empirical tests suggest they do not. In fact, carrying the analysis to its limit, empirical tests may …n d evidence of negative spillovers even in the presence of strategic complementarities since the social multiplier can be less than one, or even negative. This may be an especially important consideration in policy interventions which a¤ect many aspects of an individual's life, such as the Moving to Opportunity program (see Kling, Leibman, and Katz, 2007) , since there are likely to be many interdependent decisions which are in ‡uenced by multiple peer groups. In addition, self-ful…lling conformity is implicitly assumed when interpreting empirical tests for the strength of peer, neighborhood, or spillover e¤ects. All else equal, greater homogeneity is often interpreted as evidence of a stronger social interactions e¤ect. Underlying this interpretation is that the social multiplier is larger when the taste for conformity is greater and self-ful…lling conformity holds. Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2003) use this insight as a theoretical basis for estimating the size of the multiplier in several di¤er-ent contexts. This paper shows that this may be a dubious interpretation in certain applications.
Concluding Remarks
Despite a vast literature on peer e¤ects, this is the …r s t paper to show that the social multiplier may be less than one in the presence of strategic complementarities when decisions are multidimensional and interdependent. This paper also formalizes a notion of self-ful…lling conformity and demonstrates that this property does not hold uniformly across the parameter space. However, we show that uniqueness under moderate social in ‡uence is retained. To show that these results are more than a theoretical curiosity, we obtained these results in a concrete model of marriage and divorce and generalized the …n d i n g s to other contexts (e.g., …n a n c i a l assets, smoking, labor markets, and network goods).
An important extension of this research is to …n d general conditions under which the social multiplier is greater than one and conditions under which self-ful…lling conformity holds in a general multidimensional choice model, and to further explore the relationship between the two concepts. The insights developed in this paper and some of the formal results are likely to be helpful in this endeavor.
Appendix
Proofs Omitted from Text
Proof of Lemma 1.
The model described in the text is a hierarchical probability model where a joint distribution of the random vector ( o ; y ) is implied. In particular, if F is the (implicit) distribution of ( o ; y ) then the conditional distribution of o given that y = y is F o (:j y = y ) and the marginal distribution of y is F y : While only couples that decide to marry receive a draw from F o ; it is a useful and innocuous abstraction to proceed in the proof as if nature draws a realization of the random vector ( o ; y ) when each pair of singles is initially matched, but only reveals the realization of o in the second period if y x:
Let F m be the empirical distribution associated with m draws from F: As there are in…nitely many couples, the empirical distribution of ( o ; y ) in the population (for a given set of draws) is given by lim m!1 F m = F 1 : But the Glivenko-Cantelli lemma implies sup q jF m (q) F (q)j = 0 almost surely whenever m ! 1, or F 1 = F (a:s:) 22 The proportion of couples that remain single in the …r s t life stage is equal to the proportion for whom y < x; but since F 1 = F a:s: this is almost surely equal to F y (x) : In other words, = Pr ( y < x) almost surely. (Note that the proportion of couples that remain single equals the proportion of individuals that remain single).
By de…nition the divorce rate equals the fraction of the population that marries and divorces, divided by the fraction that marries. In other words, equals the fraction of couples for whom y x and o < z, divided by the fraction for whom y x: But since F 1 = F a:s:, is almost surely equal to
: Bayes'rule implies Pr( o < zj y x) = Pr( o<z; y x) Pr( y x)
; so that = Pr( o < zj y x) a:s:, as desired. 22 Let 1 ; 2 ; ::: be an in…nite sequence of (realized) draws from the distribution F: Let F m be the empirical distribution associated with m such draws. The Glivenko-Cantelli Lemma states that with probability 1, F m converges uniformly to F as m increases without bound: sup
See Durrett (1996) .
Proof of Theorem 1. For ease of exposition, rewrite system (4) as
Proving that there exists (x 1 ; z 1 ) = (x 2 ; z 2 ) that satis…es (13)- (14) is equivalent to proving the existence of a …x e d point in system (4).
Since v is bounded, it is simple to verify from equation (13) that for any
We can therefore restrict our search for an equilibrium to (x 1 ; z 1 ) 2 R Z:
Notice that for any (x 1 ; z 1 ) 2 R 2 the right hand side of equation (14) must lie in a compact interval since v and Pr ( o z 1 jx 1 ) are bounded functions. Let a and a be the associated greatest lower and least upper bounds. In contrast, the left hand side is strictly increasing in x 2 and traverses the real line as x 2 traverses the real line. To see this, notice that Pr
is the expected value of the function
As h ( o ) is increasing in o it follows from …r s t -o r d e r stochastic dominance that
Hence for any z 1 ; x 2 + E (h ( o ; z 1 ) jx 2 ) passes through [a; a] as x 2 traverses the real line. Moreover, continuity ensures that for any z 1 there exists a unique x 0 2 and x 00 2 such that x
X; where x = inf fx 0 2 jz 1 2 Zg 2 ( 1; 1) and x = sup fx 00 2 jz 2 2 Zg 2 ( 1; 1) for any x 1 2 R: Thus we can restrict our search for an equilibrium to (x 1 ; z 1 ) 2 X Z:
Hence, for any (x 1 ; z 1 ) 2 X Zwe have (x 2 ; z 2 ) 2 X Z, that is, system (13)-(14) de…nes a continuous mapping X Z ! X Z. Finally, since X Z is a compact and convex set, Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem gives the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 2. As is standard in stability theory, we can assume that the …x e d point x of (6) is the zero solution. To see this, set y t = x t x: Then We wish to apply the logic of a Liapunov function to prove this so we must show that condition (M) implies that A is compact. To this end, notice that the assumptions in the theorem and the implicit function theorem imply that, for any given vector x t ; we can write x t+1 = G t (x t ); where G t is the implicit function induced by H: Let L be the line segment joining any two points x t ; x 0 t 2 A: The multivariable mean value theorem states that
is a matrix whereas the other terms are vectors. The matrix norm in this inequality is that which is induced by the vector norm. The implicit function theorem gives
By convexity of A, condition (M) implies that max q2L kD xt G t (q)k < 1: So selecting x t 6 = x 0 t , x 0 t = 0 and noting that G t (0) = 0, inequality (15) implies
which holds for all t: Since this holds for all t; we have kx 0 k > kx 1 k > kx 2 k > : Consequently, we can restrict attention to B kx 0 k (0) A, the closed ball contained in A that is centered at 0 and has radius kx 0 k : Note that B kx 0 k (0) is compact.
Since the mapping x t 7 ! kx t k is continuous, kx t k 0 with equality i¤ x = 0; and kG t (x t )k kx t k with equality i¤ x = 0; we can use this vector norm as a Liapunov function to prove that the equilibrium of (6) (6) takes the form H(y t+1 + x; y t + x) = 0 which has the zero solution as the equilibrium that corresponds to the equilibrium solution x of (6).
The matrix in condition (M), suppressing time subscripts, equals
Condition (M) is satis…ed if each of the entries in this matrix is small enough. For example, the matrix 1 norm for a k k matrix A is max 
24 This calculation allows for the upper limit of the support of F o (:j y ) to depend on y : The upper limit of integration (x) in the integrals below is therefore a function of x: The calculations for the matrix elements use Leibniz's Rule and these two facts: Fortunately, when we wish to apply condition (M) only locally around an equilibrium we can take advantage of the fact that R = z. This simpli…es the matrix to
The corresponding inequalities become
Derivation of the social multipliers. Totally di¤erentiating system (4) gives
Setting x = x = z = 0; letting E I x = E x when x = x = z = 0 and noting that E 25 We wish to emphasize that Lemma 2 is ‡e x i b l e because condition (M) may be satis…ed using any matrix p norm. Another example is the matrix 1 norm, which for a k k matrix A is kAk 1 = max Hence, the singlehood multiplier and the divorce multiplier are 
where A v ( ) v (1 ) and B v( ) v(1 ): 27 The e¤ect on and of an increase in the desire to conform is ; respectively. Straightforward calculations on the equilibrium system (4) show that
27 Because the marginal social utility of singlehood takes into account the expected social payo¤ of being married when old, and this quantity depends on the probability of divorce, MSU s in general depends on match quality when young y : Self-ful…lling conformity, however, hinges on the response of the marginal couple to an increase in the taste for conformity, where the marginal couple is the one just indi¤erent between remaining single and marrying (i.e., for whom y = x); the key question is whether this couple strictly prefers marriage or singlehood after a marginal increase in : It is therefore su¢ cient to consider only MSU s for this marginal couple.
Calculations for the Numerical Example
The generic equilibrium equations are To calculate the divorce rate, let f( o ; y ) be the pdf of the random vector ( o ; y ) ; f( o j y ) the conditional pdf given that y = y ; and f y ( y ) the marginal pdf of y : Note that f( o j y ) is the pdf associated with the Uniform( 1; 1 + x) distribution while f y ( y ) is the pdf associated with the uniform(0; 1) distribution. Then 
